Monday, July 15, 2013

I’d like to run an idea past all of you and get your reactions.  My apologies for the length of this – I don’t know how to say this more briefly.

I’m going to use the word “random” here primarily in sense of being a property of a sequence of events that makes the n+1st event unpredictable from the first n events.  This probably conflates the words “chance” and “random” as they are used in the SEP article, but I need to get a bit more comfortable with that distinction before I start using it.

A distinction is often made between epistemic and ontologically random processes.  The former means the events it generates are unpredictable but with enough additional knowledge, it could be made predictable.  The latter typically means that no amount of additional knowledge could render the events predictable.  Some statisticians and scientists have regarded this distinction as of no practical importance since none of their practices with actual data would be any different for an epistemically random or an ontologically random process.  However, philosophers and some philosophically oriented scientists still regard the distinction as important on ontological grounds.  That is, if all randomness is epistemic, then the world is deterministic.  If ontological randomness exists, it is not.  So, they argue, much of how we see the fundamental nature of reality hinges on this question.

I’d like to argue that the distinction is not philosophically meaningful either.  Consider the example of gender selection for a child.  (The argument applies to any genetic factor in any organism that reproduces sexually, but, for clarity’s sake, let’s keep it simple.)  It’s certainly random.  Is it epistemic or ontological?  Well, the process is incredibly complex.  Enormous numbers of sperm are swimming around prior to ejaculation and the timing of which one is best positioned to win the race is critical.  And who can predict which one is the best swimmer?  Also, there are roughly 100 million conceptions each year and (with the exception of multiple births) these are independent of one another.  However, one could argue that with enough detailed knowledge, the uncertainty as to which sperm wins could be eliminated; furthermore, complete knowledge of timing could render the independence irrelevant.  So a case could be made for this being epistemically random.  However, that level of detailed knowledge is, for many reasons, inaccessible to human beings.  But perhaps it is accessible to God, so from the divine perspective, gender selection is epistemic.  But let’s suppose for the moment that God does not normally direct the gender selection process; in Thomistic terms, he uses it as a secondary agent, in this case, a non-deterministic one.  So this means that even though the detailed knowledge that would enable prediction might be available to God, He does not use it.  Let’s go even further and suppose God created it to be a non-deterministic process.  Then it follows that non-determinacy is a fundamental property of that process.  If that’s the case, it would seem inappropriate to deny its ontological randomness.  That is, if one defines ontological randomness as “not epistemic,” gender selection is not ontologically random.  But if one defines it in terms of the properties of the process God gave it, it is ontologically random.  Thus, in this sense, it is both epistemically and ontologically random.  So the distinction between them breaks down.

Of course, I still haven’t addressed the question of why I think God created the process to operate non-deterministically.   I appeal to two principles: (1) inference to the best explanation, and (2) divine goodness.  The process of gender selection along with diffusion, quantum collapse, mutation, the operation of the immune system, and many others appear random.  There is no observable evidence of a hidden agent directing them but a straightforward, transparent explanation can be given in terms of non-determinacy. So it’s the better explanation.   Also as Einstein put it, “The Creator is subtle but not malicious.”  So I would call all of these processes ontologically random without denying the possibility that knowledge may be obtainable that reduces their uncertainty.

Does this seem right?

7 comments:

  1. This question was precisely what Bohr and Einstein argued for twenty years and Einstein lost. There is ontological randomness in the world. I think this has to be considered one of the most metaphysically significant advances in all of science, eclipsed only perhaps by the discovery that there are natural laws.

    I do think though, that those of us who have studied physics, or spent time learning quantum mechanics, need to appreciate how utterly counter-intuitive it is for many scholars to insist on ontological uncertainty over mere epistemological uncertainty. One reason why Randomness is so feared is that, if real, it suggests that some mysterious unknowable "cause" is present.

    Robert Wright told me that, in a debate with Dan Dennet (sorry I have no link) he forced Dan to admit that "no cause within this physical universe accounts for quantum events." He was making the point, of course, that God could certainly influence quantum events from "outside" the universe and it would look exactly like what we encounter.

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    1. Would Einstein have won if Bohm's theory had been proposed in 1925? I.e., if a deterministic version of QM had been a live option from the start, would we still be talking about QM and ontological randomness?

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    2. Excellent point, Jeff. Both Einstein's view and that of Bohm are philosophical interpretations of the underlying mathematical laws of (non-relativistic) quantum mechanics. Jim Cushing has an excellent book on the 'hegemony' of Bohr's Copenhagen view (with Heisenberg's addition of ontological indeterminism) versus Einstein / Bohm on determinism (although non-classical, non-local). So until we can decide which interpretation is "correct" all we can do is assume one of them, state clearly that we are doing so, and follow out the consequences for theology. That's what I do with QM-NIODA>

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  2. Jim, I'm not following why the distinction breaks down. Epistemic and ontological randomness are not mutually exclusive. One can't define the latter as not being the former. If a process is ontological random then it will be epistemically random.

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    1. I would prefer to say that ontological randomness presupposes epistemic randomness but epistemic randomness is neutral to whether or not there is ontological randomness. Polk claims that "epistemology models ontology" but it certainly isn't a proof that where there is epistemic randomness there must be ontological indeterminism.

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    2. This conversation has helped clarify my thinking. What Jeff and Bob say here about epistemic and ontological randomness seems right to me.

      What I'm trying to get my mind around is a different way of thinking about randomness than is done in quantum mechanics. That is, QM leads us to think about the possibility of inherent randomness of quantum processes versus the alternative possibility of hidden global variables. However, I think that a lot of randomness that occurs in the natural world is quite different from this - it's what I'm tentatively calling "anarchical randomness." For example, consider a device detecting electromagnetic radiation from outside the earth’s atmosphere. The arrivals will follow a Poisson distribution. But each individual photon that arrives behaves according to deterministic laws. The randomness is the result of the interaction of a huge number of independent events. Even though the individual events can be considered deterministic the system as a whole appears to be a random process. Note the similarity and differences from deterministic chaos. In the latter the unpredictability arises from (1) our inability to precisely state the initial conditions and (2) the amplifying effect of the system’s dynamics. In the radiation example, the unpredictability arises from (1) our inability to know the whereabouts of all the photons that might arrive at the detector and (2) their independence. And if there is no one orchestrating the whole process (that is, if God does not directly manage the individual photons but allows them to function according to their own natural laws), the randomness is no longer merely apparent but is a fundamental property of the system. So it seems to me that the randomness is ontological but in quite a different way than in the Copenhagen interpretation of QM. Put differently, any complex system with a large number of independent components will exhibit randomness.

      But the existence of such randomness is important to understanding at least some aspects of divine action, it seems to me. That is, if one assumes universal divine causal determinism, there is a hidden manager. But if one doesn't assume that, it means that God has created, sustains, and uses indeterminate processes. Mathematical results such as the Central Limit Theorem suggest to me that God has built both randomness and ways to manage it into creation from the beginning. There's a lot more that can be said but I'll stop here for now.

      Does this make sense?

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  3. Hi, Jim, it's Bob. One thing to note is a possible conflation between classical and quantum ways of looking at your example of "anarchical randomness." From a classical perspective the electromagnetic waves obey the deterministic EM wave equation and produce a Poisson distribution of at the detector. But when you refer to individual photons and their independence we've switched to a quantum mechanical perspective where photons obey the deterministic Schroedinger equation but produce a Bose-Einstein distribution on the detector reflecting quantum indeterminism (and the distribution becomes Poisson in the correct limits). So the quantum indeterminism is there, it just doesn't show up in the classical limit / Poisson distribution.

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