Monday, July 15, 2013

I’d like to run an idea past all of you and get your reactions.  My apologies for the length of this – I don’t know how to say this more briefly.

I’m going to use the word “random” here primarily in sense of being a property of a sequence of events that makes the n+1st event unpredictable from the first n events.  This probably conflates the words “chance” and “random” as they are used in the SEP article, but I need to get a bit more comfortable with that distinction before I start using it.

A distinction is often made between epistemic and ontologically random processes.  The former means the events it generates are unpredictable but with enough additional knowledge, it could be made predictable.  The latter typically means that no amount of additional knowledge could render the events predictable.  Some statisticians and scientists have regarded this distinction as of no practical importance since none of their practices with actual data would be any different for an epistemically random or an ontologically random process.  However, philosophers and some philosophically oriented scientists still regard the distinction as important on ontological grounds.  That is, if all randomness is epistemic, then the world is deterministic.  If ontological randomness exists, it is not.  So, they argue, much of how we see the fundamental nature of reality hinges on this question.

I’d like to argue that the distinction is not philosophically meaningful either.  Consider the example of gender selection for a child.  (The argument applies to any genetic factor in any organism that reproduces sexually, but, for clarity’s sake, let’s keep it simple.)  It’s certainly random.  Is it epistemic or ontological?  Well, the process is incredibly complex.  Enormous numbers of sperm are swimming around prior to ejaculation and the timing of which one is best positioned to win the race is critical.  And who can predict which one is the best swimmer?  Also, there are roughly 100 million conceptions each year and (with the exception of multiple births) these are independent of one another.  However, one could argue that with enough detailed knowledge, the uncertainty as to which sperm wins could be eliminated; furthermore, complete knowledge of timing could render the independence irrelevant.  So a case could be made for this being epistemically random.  However, that level of detailed knowledge is, for many reasons, inaccessible to human beings.  But perhaps it is accessible to God, so from the divine perspective, gender selection is epistemic.  But let’s suppose for the moment that God does not normally direct the gender selection process; in Thomistic terms, he uses it as a secondary agent, in this case, a non-deterministic one.  So this means that even though the detailed knowledge that would enable prediction might be available to God, He does not use it.  Let’s go even further and suppose God created it to be a non-deterministic process.  Then it follows that non-determinacy is a fundamental property of that process.  If that’s the case, it would seem inappropriate to deny its ontological randomness.  That is, if one defines ontological randomness as “not epistemic,” gender selection is not ontologically random.  But if one defines it in terms of the properties of the process God gave it, it is ontologically random.  Thus, in this sense, it is both epistemically and ontologically random.  So the distinction between them breaks down.

Of course, I still haven’t addressed the question of why I think God created the process to operate non-deterministically.   I appeal to two principles: (1) inference to the best explanation, and (2) divine goodness.  The process of gender selection along with diffusion, quantum collapse, mutation, the operation of the immune system, and many others appear random.  There is no observable evidence of a hidden agent directing them but a straightforward, transparent explanation can be given in terms of non-determinacy. So it’s the better explanation.   Also as Einstein put it, “The Creator is subtle but not malicious.”  So I would call all of these processes ontologically random without denying the possibility that knowledge may be obtainable that reduces their uncertainty.

Does this seem right?

Saturday, July 13, 2013

Blog Access

Welcome to the blog discussion! I begin by asking the group two questions:

1. Shall we restrict access to viewing the blog to members of the randomness and divine providence research group?

2. Shall we restrict posting to members of the randomness and divine providence research group?

I will proceed with answers "no" and "yes" respectively, unless/until it is clear that most members prefer different answers.